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Can the Pennsylvania Courts Interpret Delay
Damages Consistently With Sovereign Immunity,
or Are They as Incompatible as Oil and Water?
In interpreting the provisions of legislatively created sovereign
immunity in recent years, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
handed down several decisions that severely restrict the right of
recovery to parties injured as a result of the negligence of the com-
monwealth and its agencies. However, once such a party does get
into court, the supreme court has been extremely liberal in its in-
terpretation of the rule permitting delay damages. This comment
asks: what sort of mixed message is the court sending?
Initially, this comment will briefly summarize the history of sov-
ereign immunity in Pennsylvania. It will then look at how the
Pennsylvania courts have interpreted one of the exceptions to leg-
islatively-created immunity-the motor vehicle exception-and
how the Pennsylvania courts have continued to take a narrow
reading of the immunity statutes. The comment will analyze recent
case law concerning the imposition of delay damages against com-
monwealth parties and expose what appears to be a conflict of pol-
icies relative to delay damages and immunity. The author will offer
a proposal to harmonize the two policies.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN PENNSYLVANIA
The first case in Pennsylvania adopting sovereign immunity was
O'Connor v. Pittsburgh.' In the decades following O'Connor, im-
munity came under criticism from both the courts and the legal
community in general.2 In Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public
1. O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187, 189 (1851).
2. In Mayle v. Department of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978), Justice Roberts
stated:
Three times in recent years we have repudiated as unfair similar status-based immu-
nities of parties. A majority of the states has rejected sovereign immunity at least to
some degree, and commentators oppose it nearly unanimously . . . [m]oreover, the
immunity accorded Pennsylvania as 'sovereign' has been far greater than that
claimed by any English king or queen at least since the restoration of the monarchy
in 1660.
Mayle, 388 A.2d at 710-11 (citations omitted).
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Education,3 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, following the
leads of many other jurisdictions,' declared that "the doctrine of
governmental immunity-long since devoid of any valid justifica-
tion-is abolished in this Commonwealth."' It is important to note
that the Ayala decision only abolished governmental immunity,
and in fact, specifically pointed out that the sovereign immunity of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was not affected by its
decision.
However, in 1978, the Ayala decision was followed by Mayle v.
Department of Highways7 wherein Justice Roberts opined that
"[o]nce the 'errors of history, logic and policy' which underly [sic]
. . . sovereign immunity. . . have been laid bare, we see no reason
to perpetuate them. . . . We therefore abolish the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity."8 It should be remembered that the court in
Ayala and Mayle was not confronted with statutorily mandated
immunities, rather it only abolished the common law doctrines of
governmental and sovereign immunity.
The General Assembly of Pennsylvania, reacting to the decision
in Mayle, reinstated sovereign and governmental immunity.9 How-
3. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973).
4. The Ayala opinion contains an appendix that sets forth the various jurisdictions
and their positions on sovereign immunity. That listing is not reprinted here because an
elaboration on the historical roots of sovereign immunity is beyond the scope of this
comment.
The Ayala decision was four-to-three, with Justices Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Mander-
ino siding with the abolitionists and Chief Justice Jones, and Justices Eagen and O'Brien
dissenting. Ayala, 305 A.2d at 889.
5. Id. at 878 (citations omitted).
6. Id. The distinction between governmental immunity (also called local governmen-
tal immunity) and sovereign immunity is that sovereign immunity attaches to the state or
commonwealth, while governmental immunity attaches to local government agencies such as
cities, towns and school districts. Mayle, 388 A.2d at 714-15.
7. 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978).
8. Id. at 719-20 (citations omitted). In the time between Ayala and Mayte, Chief
Justice Jones had left the bench and was replaced by Justice Larsen. Mayle was decided by
a four-to-three majority, with Justices Roberts, Nix, Manderino and Larsen aligning with
abolition, and Chief Justice Eagen and Justices Pomeroy and O'Brien dissenting. Note that
Justice Pomeroy had approved of abolishing governmental immunity, but disapproved of
abrogating sovereign immunity. Id.
9. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2310 (1978).
Pursuant to section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is hereby
declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its
officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy
sovereign and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General
Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity. When the General Assembly specifi-
cally waives sovereign immunity, a claim against the Commonwealth and its officials
and employees shall be brought only in such manner and in such courts and in such
Comments
ever, the enacting legislation provides statutorily created excep-
tions to sovereign immunity.10 Under Mascaro v. Youth Study
Center," the court held that as a precondition to maintaining an
action against a commonwealth agency, plaintiffs have to satisfy
three statutory requirements."2 First, plaintiffs must demonstrate
that, were it not for the defense of sovereign immunity, they would
have a cause of action recognized either at common law or pro-
vided by statute.'" Secondly, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that
the injury was caused by the negligent acts of the commonwealth
agency or an employee acting within the scope of his or her office
or duties (excluding acts of crimes, fraud, malice or willful miscon-
duct). 4 Finally, the more difficult hurdle for plaintiffs, the plaintiff
must establish that the cause of action falls within one of the stat-
utorily created exceptions to sovereign immunity, 5 as enunciated
under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act.' 6 One of the ex-
ceptions to sovereign immunity under the Political Subdivisions
Tort Claims Act, and a fertile area for litigation, is the motor vehi-
cle exception.'
7
THE MOTOR VEHICLE ExCEPTION TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Pennsylvania has created several transportation authorities to
provide mass transportation facilities for urban areas. These au-
thorities are defined as commonwealth agencies under current case
cases as directed by the provisions of Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial pro-
cedure) unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute.
Id.
10. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8521(a) (1982).
(a) General rule.-Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no provision of this
title shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity for the purpose of 1 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 2310 (relating to sovereign immunity reaffirmed; specific waiver) or otherwise.
Id.
11. 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987).
12. Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1121.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1123.
15. Id.
16. Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1121-23 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(a)).
17. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b) provides in pertinent part:
The following acts by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability
on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to
claims for damages caused by:
... The operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of a Com-
monwealth party. As used in this paragraph, "motor vehicle" means any vehi-
cle which is self-propelled and any attachment thereto, including vehicles oper-
ated by rail, through water or in the air.
1994
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law.18 As can be expected, the vast majority of claims and lawsuits
for personal injury related to these transportation entities arises
under the motor vehicle exception to sovereign immunity.19 Just
what is the motor vehicle exception, and how have the courts inter-
preted it?
The motor vehicle exception is limited to operation of a motor
vehicle.20 While the statute defines motor vehicle,21 the courts have
been left to their own resources with the more difficult question of
what constitutes operation. In answering that question, the su-
preme court, in the seminal case of Love v. City of Philadelphia,22
noted that "exceptions to governmental immunity were to be 'nar-
rowly interpreted . . . given the expressed legislative intent to in-
sulate political subdivisions from tort liability.' ",23
In Love, the plaintiff was a seventy-three year old woman, who
was blind in one eye and had impaired vision in the other.24 The
defendant, City of Philadelphia ("City"), provided her with van
service to a senior citizens' center.25 It was the van driver's custom
to place a portable stepping stool beneath the bottom step of the
van so that Mrs. Love could more easily traverse the distance to
the ground.26 On the date of her accident, the plaintiff alleged that
the stepping stool was not properly placed by the defendant's
agent, and, as a result she fell, suffering multiple injuries that
caused her to be confined to a nursing home.27 In affirming the
commonwealth court's decision that overturned the jury's verdict
against the City,28 Justice McDermott stated that entering or exit-
ing a motor vehicle do not constitute operation of a motor vehicle,
18. Miller v. Erie Metro. Transit Auth., 618 A.2d 1095 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). In
Miller, Judge Pellegrini stated "[o]ur Supreme Court in Marshall v. Port Authority of Alle-
gheny County, 568 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1990), has determined that transportation authorities are
commonwealth agencies rather than local agencies and are entitled to sovereign immunity
because they exercise the public powers of the Commonwealth as agencies." Miller, 618 A.2d
at 1096 n.3.
19. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b)(1).
20. Id.
21. Id. The statute defines motor vehicle as "any vehicle which is self-propelled and
any attachment thereto, including vehicles operated by rail, through water or in the air." 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b)(1).
22. 543 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1988).
23. Love, 543 A.2d at 532 (quoting Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118, 1123
(Pa. 1987)).
24. Id. at 531.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 532.
28. The verdict was $375,000.00. Love, 543 A.2d at 532.
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but are "ancillary" acts and immunity attaches to such acts.2 9
At first blush, there is a paradox here-how can the court say in
Mayle that there is no longer any justification for immunity, and
just fifteen years later, read an exception to statutorily created im-
munity so narrowly? It is easy to excuse this anomaly by parroting
the court's words and saying that exceptions to immunity were to
be narrowly interpreted.30 The more accurate response is that the
supreme court had undergone a change of personnel and philoso-
phy. With the departure of five members of the Mayle court,"1 and
no binding precedent regarding interpretation of the newly enacted
statutory immunity, the Love court was able to develop its own
views on the issue. In retrospect, one would think that if the court
was ever to be accused of judicial activism and was looking for a
case to dilute the effect of the legislative reenactment of sovereign
immunity, the facts in Love would have been especially appealing.
On one side of the scales there was a very sympathetic plaintiff
with debilitating injuries that destroyed her lifestyle, while on the
other side was the faceless public coffers. The court could have
very easily taken an expansive interpretation to include assisting a
person out of a motor vehicle in the term operation. Nevertheless,
the court was unpersuaded and ruled in favor of the economic
argument.32
In the aftermath of Love, several decisions have further refined
29. Id. Quoting Justice McDermott:
According to the word "operation", the van was not in operation at the time of Mrs.
Love's accident. Getting into or alighting from a vehicle are merely acts ancillary to
the actual operation of that vehicle.
In summary, we wish to emphasize that the issue here is not whether one may be
tortiously injured entering or alighting from a stopped vehicle. Rather, the issue is
the confining question of whether a political subdivision is immunized from suit when
one is so injured, notwithstanding what may be the actual tort of the employees. The
legislature, for reasons of policy, reasons we are not entitled to dilute for sympathy or
even outrage at specific instances of blatant tort, has decided that such an immunity
does exist, and we must abide, sometimes leaving dreadful injuries, negligently in-
flicted, uncompensated.
Id. at 533.
Love was decided by a four-to-two majority. The only justice common to Ayala, Mayle
and Love was Chief Justice Nix. Interestingly enough, he sided with the abolitionists in both
Ayala and Mayle, but aligned with the majority in Love in a restrictive definition of "opera-
tion" of a motor vehicle. See notes 4 and 8 and accompanying text. The opinion was au-
thored by Justice Mcdermott, joined by Chief Justice Nix, and Justices Flaherty and Zap-
pala. Justices Larsen and Papadakos filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 531.
30. Id. at 532 (quoting Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1123).
31. Justices Roberts, Manderino, Eagen, Pomeroy and O'Brien left the court between
Mayle and Love.
32. Love, 543 A.2d at 533.
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and defined the interpretation of operation. In Pennsylvania State
Police v. Robinson,33 the commonwealth court ruled that a state
police car, parked in the passing lane of traffic on an interstate
highway for the purpose of investigating an accident, was not , in
operation.3 The plaintiff in Robinson was struck by another mo-
torist while standing at the rear of the police cruiser.3 5 The court
noted that even if the plaintiff was correct and the placement of
the parked police car was one that could be found to have a causal
relationship to the injury, a parked vehicle did not constitute op-
eration .3  Note that in Love and Robinson, both vehicles were
parked and unoccupied. What would the result be if the vehicle
were parked, but occupied?
In Vogel v. Langer,7 a bus driver for Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") was stopped in traffic, when
he waved another motorist across his path." When the motorist
crossed in front of the bus, he was struck by another vehicle that
was passing the bus.3 9 The trial court granted SEPTA's motion for
summary judgment, ruling that, because the bus was stopped, the
motor vehicle exception was inapposite.40 The commonwealth
court vacated the trial judge's order, holding that Love and Robin-
son were distinguishable because the vehicles involved in those
cases were completely parked, while the SEPTA vehicle was tem-
porarily stopped in traffic."' The court stated that "[t]he opera-
tion of a motor vehicle necessarily entails temporary stops. Addi-
tionally, operation of a motor vehicle entails communication with
other drivers. A wave, horn beep, or the flashing of lights are com-
33. 554 A.2d 172 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
34.' Robinson, 554 A.2d at 174. In Robinson, the trial court denied the Common-
wealth's motion for summary judgment. The Commonwealth argued that the plaintiff's
cause of action did not fall under the vehicle exception to sovereign immunity as construed
by Love. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that even if the motor vehicle exception was inap-
plicable, the result would be the same under the real estate exception. The commonwealth
court agreed that the motor vehicle exception was inappropriate, but declined to rule on the
real estate exception as that question was not certified to the court, and not fully briefed
and argued. The court vacated the trial court's order denying summary judgment, but re-
manded the case for a determination as to whether the real estate exception applied. Id. at
173.
35. Id. at 173.
36. Id. at 174.
37. 569 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
38. Vogel, 569 A.2d at 1048.





mon signals exchanged between motorists.""' Note that it is not
clear if the court in Vogel relied on the signal to the other motorist
to find that the motor vehicle exception applied to the facts
therein. If the court's use of the word "additionally" is used to fur-
ther elaborate on the point, then the court's commentary regarding
"signalling" may be considered dictum."3 The opinion may be read
to hold that a temporary stop in traffic was sufficient for the Vogel
court to find "operation" of a motor vehicle."
In Sonnenberg v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Authority,45 the
commonwealth court held that if the plaintiff was struck by a mov-
ing attachment of the bus, then the vehicle was in "operation" and
the motor vehicle exception applies."" In Sonnenberg, even though
the bus was stationary, the closing of the doors was sufficient to
meet the "vehicle operation" exception. 7 It is interesting to note
that the Sonnenberg court could have relied on the precedent of
Vogel, and held that discharging and loading passengers was a
temporary stop in traffic; however, this case was decided on the
basis that "closing of the bus doors is an act normally related to
42. Id.
43. If one accepts the court's position that a "temporary stop" does not separate
SEPTA's bus from "operation of a motor vehicle," then that holding is dispositive of the
issue before the court and the case is ripe for remand. The issue of whether "signalling acts"
constitute operation is then moot-and any further commentary on the subject is dictum.
44. Vogel, 569 A.2d at 1048. In another twist on the motor vehicle exception, in
Keesey v. Longwood Volunteer Fire Co., a driver of a volunteer fire engine, acting on behalf
of two commonwealth agencies, collided with another vehicle in an intersection when the
fire engine ran a red light while responding to an emergency. Keesey v. Longwood Volunteer
Fire Co., Inc., 601 A.2d 921 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). The other driver suffered brain damage
as a result of the accident. Keesey, 601 A.2d at 922. There was evidence of negligence on the
part of the commonwealth agency for failing to relay a "slow down" order, communicated
from the chief on the scene to the commonwealth's dispatcher. Id. The chief radioed the
"slow down" order to the dispatcher, but the fire engine was unable to receive that fre-
quency. The dispatcher was aware that the fire engine could not receive-the chief's message,
but failed to relay the message over the radio frequency that the volunteer fire company
monitored. Id. Had the order been communicated, the fire engine presumably would not
have run the red light and would not have collided with the other vehicle. Id. In affirming
the trial court's grant of summary judgment on behalf of the commonwealth parties, the
court ruled that the "failure to communicate" did not rise to "operation" and did not fall
within the motor vehicle exception. Id. at 924. (The plaintiff had entered into a settlement
and release agreement with the fire engine driver and the volunteer fire company that extin-
guished the vicarious liability of Chester and Delaware Counties. Plaintiff then sought to
litigate against said counties regarding their separate and independent acts of negligence in
failing to communicate the "slow down" order.) Id. at 923.
45. 586 A.2d 1026 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
46. Sonnenberg, 586 A.2d 1028.
47. Id.
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the 'operation' of a bus.""8 Note that there may be a conflict here
with Love, inasmuch as the Love court held that "[g]etting into or
alighting from a vehicle are merely acts ancillary to the actual op-
eration of that vehicle."49 However, Love is distinguishable in that
the injured party was not struck by a moving part of the vehicle.
50
Further, in Lehman v. County of Lebanon, Transportation Au-
thority,51 the commonwealth court ruled that the motor vehicle ex-
ception did not apply to selecting locations for bus stops.52 In Leh-
man, the minor plaintiff was struck by a motorist and plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant was negligent in not choosing a safer
area to service passengers.53
In 1992, the commonwealth court, in a case very similar to Vogel
was even more restrictive in construing the motor vehicle excep-
tion. In First National Bank v. Department of Transportation,54 a
mother and son were traveling in a vehicle that hit a Department
of Transportation ("DOT") truck, resulting in fatal injuries to the
son.5 5 At the time, the DOT truck was parked with the engine run-
ning. 6 The driver seat of the DOT truck was occupied and two
coworkers were sitting in the truck bed, preparing to set out traffic
delineators.5 7 The commonwealth court ruled that the DOT truck
1
48. Id. But see Speece v. Borough of N. Braddock, 604 A.2d 760 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992), where the court refused to find that the motor vehicle exception applied when a fire
hose swung out of control and struck the plaintiff while the fire engine was parked. Speece,
604 A.2d at 762. In Vogel the operator was still in the driver's seat, while in Speece the
operator had left the driving controls-otherwise the cases are indistinguishable.
49. Love, 543 A.2d at 533.
50. Id. See notes 22-30 and accompanying text for discussion of Love.
51. 599 A.2d 259 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
52. Lehman, 599 A.2d at 262. The minor plaintiff was struck by a motorist and
pinned against a bus being operated by the County of Lebanon Transportation Authority
("COLT"). Her leg was severely injured and required a partial amputation. Id. at 260. The
plaintiffs alleged that COLT had selected the bus stop and that it was unsafe for minor
children. Id. at 261. COLT moved for judgment on the pleadings and the Court of Common
Pleas of Lebanon County granted the same. Id. The Lehmans argued that their averments,
if proven, would make the motor vehicle exception applicable. Id. The commonwealth court
rejected the Lehmans' argument. Lehman, 599 A.2d at 262. Accord Brelish v. Clarks Green
Borough, 604 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). In Brelish, the minor plaintiff was crossing
State Route 4021, with the intention of boarding defendant's school bus when she was
struck by a car. The parents alleged that the defendant was negligent in the selection of the
school bus stop, but the commonwealth court reasoned that selection of a school bus did not
fit within the motor vehicle exception to sovereign immunity. Brelish v. Clarks Green Bor-
ough, 604 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
53. Lehman, 599 A.2d at 261.
54. 609 A.2d 911 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
55. First Nat'l, 609 A.2d at 912.
56. Id. at 913.
57. Id.
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was not in operation and denied recovery to the plaintiff.8
As pointed out earlier, a careful reading of Vogel reveals that the
court did not rely on the fact that the operator waved to the other
motorist to find that the commonwealth's vehicle was in "opera-
tion. ' 59 Rather the court in Vogel distinguished earlier cases when
it stated that "[the bus driver] applied the brakes and momenta-
rily stopped the bus because of traffic. The operation of a motor
vehicle necessarily entails temporary stops." 60 Can one distinguish
First National?
DOT's truck was temporarily stopped, with the engine running
and the operator in the driver's seat, while his coworkers deployed
the delineators 61-clearly the type of work that involves tempora-
rily stopping for short periods of time, then resuming motion for
further deployment. The court in First National relied on the
placement of the vehicle,6 2 "In the present case, the DOT vehicle
was temporarily parked on the side of the road. . . . [t]he DOT
vehicle was not stopped temporarily in traffic." 3 Transit agencies
were quick to note the distinction in the two cases and began de-
nying liability in similar cases.
In Miller v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Authority," the plaintiff
was injured as she alighted from an Erie Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority ("EMTA") bus . 5 According to the plaintiff, the steps were
worn, wet and slippery." The commonwealth court held that en-
tering and exiting the bus did not constitute "operation" and de-
nied the plaintiff's cause of action.1
7
It is clear in reviewing this progression of cases that the courts of
58. Id. at 914.
59. See Vogel, 569 A.2d at 1048.
60. Id.
61. First Nat'l, 609 A.2d at 913.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 914 (emphasis added).
64. 618 A.2d 1095 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
65. Miller, 618 A.2d at 1095.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1097. Speaking for the Miller court, Judge Pellegrini said:
While we agree that the act of alighting from bus steps into the street is an activity
normally related to a passenger's usage of the bus, we do not agree that it is an activ-
ity normally related to the 'operation' of the bus ...Miller was neither injured by
the actual movement of the bus or by a moving part of the bus when she slipped on
the steps and fell into the street. Because the definition of 'operation' does not in-
clude situations other than those where the injury is the result of the vehicle moving
or a moving part of the vehicle, EMTA is exempt from liability because Miller has no
cause of action against EMTA.
1994
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Pennsylvania take a restrictive interpretation of the motor vehicle
exception to sovereign immunity. One might assume that the same
courts, in analyzing delay damages would take a similar tack, but
that is not the case.
DELAY DAMAGES IN PENNSYLVANIA
Under Pennsylvania's Rules of Civil Procedure, whenever a
plaintiff recovers a jury verdict that exceeds the defendant's writ-
ten offer of settlement by 25%, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
interest on the jury verdict. 8 This interest is added from one year
after the service of original process on the defendant until the jury
renders its verdict."
However, under Pennsylvania case and statutory law, even after
the plaintiff has demonstrated a cognizable claim under sovereign
immunity, the financial exposure of the commonwealth and its
agencies is not unlimited.70 In tort cases, a single plaintiff is lim-
ited to $250,000 for property damage and personal injury arising
out of any one incident.
71
Of course, it was only a matter of time before a case would pre-
sent itself where adding delay damages to the jury verdict against
a commonwealth agency would exceed the $250,000 statutory limit.
In Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County,72 the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania held that the $250,000 ceiling can be
raised by the imposition of delay damages, and justified its posi-
tion by reasoning that commonwealth agencies should be required
to bargain with injured plaintiffs in good faith. 7 The court rea-
68. PA. R. Civ. P. 238(b)(1).
69. PA. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(2)(ii). Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in pertinent part that "[a]t the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking
monetary relief for bodily injury, death or property damage, damages for delay shall be
added to the amount of compensatory damages . PA. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(1) (emphasis
added).
70. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (1982). See also Laudenberger v. Port Auth.
of Allegheny County, 436 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1981). The limitations on damages recoverable
against agencies of the commonwealth are codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528 that
provides in pertinent part:
Actions for which damages are limited by reference to this subchapter shall be lim-
ited as set forth in this section.
... Damages arising from the same cause of action or transaction or occurrence or
series of causes of action or transactions or occurrences shall not exceed $250,000 in
favor of any plaintiff or $1,000,000 in the aggregate.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (1982).
71. Id.
72. 436 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1981).
73. Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 156.
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soned that such a policy provides agencies with sufficient incen-
tives to discourage "stonewalling" deserving plaintiffs.7 4
The leading Pennsylvania case on imposing delay damages on a
commonwealth agency is Woods v. Department of Transporta-
tion.5 Timothy Woods was riding his motorcycle on a state high-
way.76 His motorcycle left the road after failing to make a turn, hit
a utility pole, and he was impaled on a fence, suffering serious in-
juries.77 Subsequently, he filed suit against the state Department of
Transportation ("DOT") alleging that his injuries were the result
of a defectively designed highway. 78 Prior to trial, DOT offered
$65,000 in settlement that Woods rejected. 79 The case ultimately
resulted in a jury verdict wherein Woods was awarded $1,500,000.80
The trial court reduced that amount to $250,000 1-the statutory
cap on damages attributable to a commonwealth party under the
Sovereign Immunity Act.2
Woods then filed post-trial motions, seeking to have rule 23883
delay damages imposed on the full verdict.8 ' The trial court, while
agreeing that delay damages were appropriate, declined Woods' re-
quest to assess the damages on the $1,500,000 verdict and, instead,
imposed the delay damages on DOT's statutory cap of $250,000.85
If one accepts Woods' argument, that delay damages should be im-
posed on the total jury verdict, then the delay damages would have
amounted to $622,386.95.86 The trial court, unpersuaded by
Woods' argument, adopted DOT's analysis and imposed
74. Id. This comment does not address that issue. Rather, it attempts to examine
those cases wherein the jury verdict exceeds the $250,000 statutory cap, the trial court then
reduces the verdict to the statutory cap, and the plaintiff moves to have delay damages
added to the verdict. The question presented to the court in those cases is whether to add
the delay damages to the full verdict (in excess of $250,000) or to the verdict as reduced by
the court to $250,000.





80. Woods, 612 A.2d at 970.
81. Id.
82. See notes 9 and 10 for more information on statutory authority for sovereign
immunity.
83. PA. R. Civ. P. 238. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of rule
238.





$103,731.15 in delay damages on the $250,000 molded verdict."'
Woods appealed that portion of the trial court's decision relative
to the amount of delay damages. s8 The commonwealth court, rely-
ing on its precedent established in Kowal v. Department of Trans-
portation,9 (wherein it applied the delay damages to the molded
verdict) affirmed the trial court's decision.90 Woods then petitioned
for allowance of appeal and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted same.91 The supreme court reversed, holding that rule 238
"is clear and unambiguous and is indicative of the intent to have
damages apply to the verdict or award itself, which represents the
actual factfinder's assessment of the plaintiff's damage, as opposed
to the amount the plaintiff is legally entitled to recover.
92
ANALYSIS-RULE 238-SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL?
There is no question that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has the power, under article 5, section 10(c) of the state constitu-
tion, "to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and
the conduct of all courts."93 The more accurate question is whether
the power to proscribe rules governing practice encompasses the
power to impose delay damages. If one concludes that it does, is
that power unfettered, or are there limits on the power of the court
to impose those delay damages? At what point (or better, what
dollar amount) does the imposition of delay damages go beyond an
effort to move cases more expeditiously through the court system,
and become punitive in nature? If the delay damages surpass the
compensatory damages (as in Woods) are not the substantive
rights of the parties affected?
Initially, the court addressed the question of whether delay dam-
ages may be' imposed, in any amount, on commonwealth agencies."
Turning to its own precedent in Laudenberger v Port Authority of
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 515 A.2d 116 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), petition for allowance of appeal denied,
524 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1987).
90. Woods, 612 A.2d at 970.
91. Id. at 971.
92. Id. at 972. The majority opinion, authored by Justice McDermott, was joined by
Chief Justice Nix and Justices Papadakos and Cappy. Justice Larsen, did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case. Justice Zappala did not participate in the decision
of this case. Justice Flaherty filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
93. PA. CONST. art. V § 10(c).
94. See Woods, 612 A.2d at 971.
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Comments
Allegheny County, 5 the court summarily disposed of that issue in
the affirmative.96 In Laudenberger, the court noted that "the
Pennsylvania Constitution gives the state's Supreme court exclu-
sive power to establish rules of procedure for state Courts [and]
the legislature is without power to control procedure."'97 The court
stated further, "it is not the legislators who are held accountable
by the public for the efficient and orderly administration of the
courts, but the judiciary itself."98 While it makes for nice argument
that the court has a valid interest in a more "orderly administra-
tion of the courts," that argument overlooks the simple fact that
the court is unable to point to any constitutional power to promul-
gate rules that are substantive in nature.
In his discussion on that point, Chief Justice O'Brien, speaking
for the Laudenberger court, acknowledged that "[n]umerous fed-
eral courts have ruled that, under the Erie doctrine, state pre-judg-
ment interest (delay damages) rules concern substantive rights of
the parties and are therefore applicable to diversity cases."99 Fur-
ther, the court acknowledged that of nine other states that permit
the addition of prejudgment interest, in eight the delay damages
were provided by statutory enactments promulgated by their legis-
latures. 00 If one accepts the court's own assessment presented in
Laudenberger, that the legislature is without power to control pro-
cedure, and assumes that the constitutions of those states impose
similar restrictions on their legislatures, then it must follow that
rules on prejudgment interest are as much substantive in nature as
procedural.'0' Lastly, the Laudenberger court stated that "one can
always argue, and not unconvincingly, that Rule 238 creates a new
95. 436 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1981).
96. Woods, 612 A.2d at 971.
97. Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 152 (citation omitted).
98. Id. (citing A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Ju-
dicial Rule-making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 10 (1958)).
99. Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 152 (citing Plantation Key Developers, Inc. v. Colonial
Mortgage Co., 589 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1979); Clissold v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 600 F.2d 35 (6th
Cir. 1979); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 480 F. Supp.
1280 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981); Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d
1287 (3d Cir. 1972)) (emphasis added).
100. Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 153. States providing relief via statutes are Colorado,
Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South
Dakota. The only state providing prejudgment interest via a judge-made rule is New Jersey.
Id. at 153 n.8.
101. As in other areas (for example, statutes of limitations, rules of evidence), the pro-
cedural and substantive distinction is often lost. The majority and dissenting opinions in
Busik v. Levine, 307 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1973), are illustrative of the difficulty in drawing a
bright line between the two.
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substantive right."102
In reading Chief Justice O'Brien's opinion, one gets the impres-
sion that he is headed in the wrong direction in his search for
foundation for his premise that the court has constitutional power
to pass a rule that unquestionably affects the substantive rights of
the parties. However, after the court considered the reasoning of
other jurisdictions, referring to "'numerous federal courts' [that]
have ruled that . . . prejudgment interest rules concern substan-
tive rights of the parties" 10 3 and that in eight out of nine states
that have pre-judgment interest rules, the rules were passed by the
respective legislatures, 10 the Laudenberger court rejected the con-
trary case law in other jurisdictions.10 5 Further, the court ignored
the lack of a constitutional foundation for its position, and turned
to the only precedent comporting with its own view, that of New
Jersey, as set forth under the reasoning of Busik v. Levine.106 Not-
ing that Busik had withstood a federal challenge as to the constitu-
tionality of a rule embodying delay damages, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was quick to align its reasoning with that of Busik.1
0°
However, there was a problem with Busik that the Laudenberger
court should have addressed-the New Jersey Constitution does
not place limitations on the Supreme Court of New Jersey's sub-
stantive law-making ability. 08 Again, Chief Justice O'Brien down-
102. Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 155 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 152.
104. Id. at 153.
105. Id.
106. 307 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973). Busik was a
consolidated appeal that questioned whether the New Jersey Supreme Court had constitu-
tional power to assess prejudgment delay damages in tort cases, and, if so, whether prejudg-
ment interest should be applied retrospectively, The court, in a five-to-two decision, held
that "the grant of interest under the rules is well within the inherent powers of this Court."
Busik, 307 A.2d at 582. However, in Justice Hall's concurring opinion he noted that "it
would be more appropriate in the future for rules proposed by the court in these overlap-
ping areas [procedural and substantive] to be worked out in advance cooperatively between
[sic] the three branches of government." Id. at 584 (Hall, J., concurring). In his dissent,
Judge Conford was quick to point out "[o]n the face of that language [New Jersey's Consti-
tution] the grant of general rule making power to the court extends only to practice and
procedure" and "the Court was without power to promulgate [a prejudgment interest rule]."
Id. at 585 (Conford, J. dissenting) (temporarily assigned to the court).
107. Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 153.
108. Busik, 307 A.2d at 577. In Busik the court stated,
The constitutional grant of rule-making power as to practice and procedure is simply
a grant of power; it would be a mistake to find in that grant restrictions upon judicial
techniques for the exercise of that power, and a still larger mistake to suppose that




played this "minor inconsistency" when he stated:
In Pennsylvania, this Court is limited by the language of the Constitution to
promulgating only those rules which do not interfere with the substantive
rights of litigants. Although New Jersey's Constitution does not specify as
much, that is not to say that the power of the judiciary [in New Jersey] is
without boundaries . . . . Consequently, there is no substantive distinction
between New Jersey and Pennsylvania with respect to the judicial proce-
dural rule-making authority."0 9
How can the court say in one breath that the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution has limiting language as to rules interfering with substantive
rights of the litigants, admit that there is no such limitation in the
New Jersey Constitution, and in the next breath say that there is
no substantive distinction between the two? For the Laudenberger
court to admit that it was without constitutional authority to im-
pose rules that so clearly affect the substantive rights of the par-
ties, and to approve of rules that do affect those rights, is a clear
case of ipse dixit.
While the court's reasoning in Laudenberger is very suspect, let
us assume that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania does indeed
have the power to impose delay damages and address the issue
that Woods presents. Under the statutory provisions of sovereign
immunity, the legislature has limited the recovery for property
damage and personal injury per plaintiff, to $250,000 and to
$1,000,000 in the aggregate, to all plaintiffs whose cause of action
arises out of the same occurrence. 110 These limitations have with-
stood challenges as to their constitutionality.111 While one could
argue the benefits and costs of such limitations, that argument is
best left to the legislature. As the courts are quick to point out,
they do not sit as a super-legislature to pass on the wisdom of leg-
islation."2 As long as the legislature has the power to pass the leg-
islation and it is constitutional, the court must defer to it."'
However, if the court really believes that it must defer to consti-
Id.
109: Laudenberger, 436 A.2d at 153-54 (emphasis added).
110. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (1982).
111. . See Lyles v. City of Philadelphia, 490 A.2d 936 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
112. See, e.g., Ray v. Commonwealth, 276 A.2d 509 (Pa. 1971), where the court stated
that "[t]his court does not sit to judge the wisdom of the Legislature's policies." Ray, 276
A.2d 510. See also Wanamaker v. School Dist., 274 A.2d 524, 529 (Pa. 1971) ("It has become
a mere platitude to state, what has so often been proclaimed, that courts are concerned, not
with the wisdom of legislation, but with the right of the legislative body to enact it,-not
with policy but with power.").
113. Ray, 276 A.2d at 510.
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tutional legislation, how does one explain the Woods decision? The
trial court reduced Woods' verdict from $1,500,000 to $250,000.
Why? Because the legislature has told the court that common-
wealth agencies simply cannot be made to pay an amount above
$250,000 to an individual plaintiff, no matter the degree of negli-
gence, or the severity of the injuries and the court must defer to
the wishes of the legislature. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
cannot deny the merit of that point. In fact, step back and take
another look at Kowal v. Department of Transportation.114 The
facts of Kowal are on all fours with Woods and in fact, the defend-
ant in both lawsuits was the Pennsylvania Department of Trans-
portation. The plaintiff in Kowal received serious injuries from a
motor vehicle accident and was rendered a quadriplegic. Delay
damages were assessed, not on the jury verdict of over $1,000,000,
but on the statutory cap of $250,000. Kowal's petition for allocatur
to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was denied and the plaintiff
was not allowed to recover delay damages on the full jury ver-
dict.115 How can one explain the two cases?
In analyzing Woods to look for justification for the court's com-
plete about face, Justice McDermott points out that rule 238 com-
pensates the injured party for loss of money during the pendency
of the proceedings, 1 6 and, provides compensation to a plaintiff for
delay in receiving monetary damages.117 However, if one agrees
with the court on that point, that the plaintiff is entitled to inter-
est for late delivery of the monetary damages, what has the plain-
tiff lost? If DOT had acceded to plaintiff's demands on day one,
and given Mr. Woods his $250,000 (assuming that was the plain-
tiff's demand)-the most he could recover according to the legisla-
ture of this commonwealth-he could have invested the $250,000
and received interest on that amount. The court cannot, under any
scenario (absent a voluntary payment by the defendant in excess
of its statutory cap) demonstrate that the plaintiff should have re-
ceived $1,500,000 to invest from day one. How then can the court
impose a prejudgment interest assessment on $1,500,000?
The court justified its assessment of delay damages by indicating
that defendants, seeking to avoid the imposition of same, will do
what men of conscience should do, and not take advantage of the
114. 515 A.2d 116 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), petition for allowance of appeal denied,
524 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1987).
115. Kowal, 524 A.2d 496.




backlog in the courts of this commonwealth to hold on to what
rightly belongs to the plaintiff.11 While one could agree with that
argument, Mr. Woods was never entitled to an offer of more than
$250,000 under the sovereign immunity laws of this common-
wealth. Further, one would assume that-the imposition of $104,000
in delay damages (on $250,000) would not sit well with those over-
seeing the litigation unit of DOT and that should be sufficient mo-
tivation to see that proper offers are made under appropriate
circumstances.
If the legislature decries the imposition of compensatory dam-
ages exceeding $250,000 on a commonwealth agency, how can the
court justify delay damages of more than $600,000? The court has
gone beyond its grant of authority and usurped the power of the
legislature. Under the guise of reducing the backlog in the courts
and promoting settlement discussions, the court has trampled the
clear intent of the legislature to cap exposure of commonwealth
agencies at $250,000. Further, an assessment in excess of $600,000
in delay damages on a molded verdict of $250,000 is punitive in
nature and has nothing to do with the backlog in the courts. On at
least one occasion, the supreme court has rejected pleas from a
plaintiff who has questioned the inequity (and in fact the constitu-
tionality) of the statutory cap on damages and denied allowance of
appeal, suggesting that the court's hands are tied.11 9 However,
under the reasoning of Woods, the court may have discovered that
the knot that tied its hands and frustrated various plaintiffs in the
past may be nothing more than a slip knot.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
How can this apparent inequity be remedied? Unfortunately, the
court has placed itself in a position where it cannot easily remedy
the situation and bring delay damage assessments in line with the
intent that the legislature showed in drafting the immunity legisla-
tion. Woods is so clear and unambiguous that the supreme court
cannot retreat from its position and at the same time maintain the
respect that such a body should command. The only solution to
this apparent incongruity lies with the legislature. The sovereign
immunity statute should be amended to more clearly express the
legislature's intent.
118. Id.
119. Kowal v. Department of Transp., 515 A.2d 116 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), petition
for allowance of appeal denied , 524 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1987).
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One can certainly agree that the court has a legitimate concern
that commonwealth parties should not use the backlog in the
courts to stonewall deserving plaintiffs. Commonwealth parties
should continue to be exposed to the threat of delay damages.
However, that exposure should be limited to (a) assessing the in-
terest on the verdict, up to a verdict of $250,000, (and ignoring any
verdict amount over $250,000), or (b) assessing the interest on the
full jury verdict, but limiting the interest to the defendant's origi-
nal exposure, that is, a commonwealth agency's delay damages
could not exceed $250,000, for a total award of $500,000. Such a
move would allow the court to continue to attempt to move cases
more swiftly through the court system, while reducing the threat of
unlimited delay verdicts. While this approach would not com-
pletely restore the sovereign immunity limits that the legislature
has bestowed on commonwealth parties, it would permit public en-
tities to preserve already precious fiscal resources and use them to
provide services for which the agencies were created.
Colin Meneely
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